A hidden ambiguity of the term â€œfeedbackâ€ in its use as an explanatory mechanism for psychophysical visual phenomena by Talis Bachmann
OPINION ARTICLE
published: 22 July 2014
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00780
A hidden ambiguity of the term “feedback” in its use as an
explanatory mechanism for psychophysical visual
phenomena
Talis Bachmann*
Institute of Public Law, University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia
*Correspondence: talis.bachmann@ut.ee
Edited by:
Haluk Ogmen, University of Houston, USA
Reviewed by:
Frouke Hermens, University of Aberdeen, UK
Stephanie Goodhew, The Australian National University, Australia
Keywords: awareness, reentrant processing, feedforward processing, non-specific thalamocortical modulation, masking
Over the last decades many researchers
have used concepts like “feedback,” “reen-
trance,” “backpropagation,” “top–down
(modulation),” or “reverse hierarchy” to
specify the mechanisms that underlie var-
ious visual phenomena (e.g., Di Lollo
et al., 2000; Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000;
Pascual-Leone and Walsh, 2001; Supèr
et al., 2001; Ro et al., 2003; Ahissar
and Hochstein, 2004; Bar et al., 2006;
Fahrenfort et al., 2007; Koivisto, 2012).
An incomplete list of these phenomena
includes visual (object substitution) mask-
ing, shape discrimination, illusory con-
tours, illusory motion, priming effects,
etc. Empirical evidence or theoretical
argumentation in favor of the suggested
mechanismic explanations mainly consists
in finding or postulating an association
between a temporally delayed, secondary
activition of lower level neural units with
correct reports of target stimuli, even
though the higher level neural units in
the processing hierarchy were already acti-
vated earlier. On that basis, feedforward
processing has been argued to be insuf-
ficient for target perception. However, in
most of the studies the relative tempo-
ral order of activity at different levels
alone is taken as proof of reentrant mod-
ulation without precisely measuring the
neural sources of this top–down effect. In
principle, it is equally possible that the
source of the higher level activity from
which the top–down signals are sent back
to earlier feature-encoding neural units
(i) is specifically linked to those features
by virtue of constituting the higher level
nodes associated with specific attributes
of the target stimulus (thus mediating
feature-binding for object integration) or
(ii) is not specifically linked in this man-
ner. In the latter case, the source of top–
down modulation may be the result of the
arousal or alerting boost triggered by the
target stimulus via feedforward collateral
activation of subcortical reticulo-thalamic
units, which in turn is followed by the
cortical spread of the thalamocortical acti-
vation, including the downpropagation of
the non-specific wave of modulation to
the early cortical areas. The non-specific
system functions include arousal, atten-
tional modulation, intercortical synchro-
nization of neural activity, bringing the
preconsciously processed specific content
to awareness, “event-holding” the content
in working memory, and alerting subjects
to newly appearing objects and changes
(Magoun, 1958; Purpura, 1970; Purpura
and Schiff, 1997; Jones, 2001; Llinás and
Ribary, 2001; Van der Werf et al., 2002;
Ribary, 2005; Schiff et al., 2013; Saalmann,
2014). This non-specific system (NSP) tar-
gets layer-1 apical dendrites of the layer-5
and -6 pyramidal neurons. But since NSP-
modulation is directed at the cortical neu-
rons with specific representational func-
tions, its functionmay go unacknowledged
because the cortical units, when activated
by NSP-modulation, can produce content-
specific subjective effects misleading us to
believe that the entire process has been
specific throughout.
The focus of the present paper will be
on the experimental-behavioral and neu-
robiological evidence in comparing the
two processing modes, (i) and (ii), with
arguments from computational modeling
left for some other occasion.
It is known that reticulo-thalamic,
intralaminar and other matrix cells of
the NSP project more heavily to lat-
eral and frontal cortical areas and less
so to the primary visual areas. (Even
when rare examples of direct intralaminar-
thalamic input to V1 were documented,
these afferents were found to be much
sparser than themore frontal ones—Miller
and Benevento, 1979.) Moreover, this
more rostrally directed thalamo-cortical
flow can cause cortical responses as fast
as or even faster than the afferent vol-
leys through the specific geniculo-cortical
pathways ignite primary visual cortical
responses strongly enough (Kennedy and
Baleydier, 1977; Kaufman and Rosenquist,
1985; Herkenham, 1986; Cruikshank et al.,
2012; Liang et al., 2013; Saalmann, 2014).
Thus, the primary cortical areas receive
NSP-modulation not directly, but via the
higher level cortical neurons that project
onto apical parts of the layer-5 pyrami-
dal neurons in the lower cortical areas.
Consequently, as illustrated in Figure 1,
we have two principal modes through
which lower level neural units L responsi-
ble for encoding sensory features of per-
ceptual objects receive top–down input
from higher levels H: (i) from the spe-
cific nodes in H that were previously
activated by L in a cortical feedforward
manner and that now send reentrant sig-
nals back to L (here the feedforward-
reentrant loop pertains to the specific
sensory-perceptual attributes constituting
a perceptual object LH); and (ii) from the
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FIGURE 1 | Two alternative modes (i, ii) of top–down effects within the hierarchical
perceptual processing system featuring specific low level neural units L, higher level specific
nodes H, and a generic non-specific activation G boosted by the non-specific thalamocortical
afference from NSP.
generic nodes G that were activated by
the boost of the NSP directed at the
more frontal and mid-level cortical neu-
rons that now send their downpropagat-
ing wave to the lower level visual areas,
including L.
When analyzing the experimental data
from most of the studies that propose
specific top–down linkages (i), there is no
direct evidence that would invalidate the
alternative, non-specific theory of down-
propagation (ii). The specificity of visual
experiences is due to the fact that the NSP-
modulation arrives at specific early units
L and may not be due to the specificity
of the higher level from where this mod-
ulation arrives. Although the direct input
from NSP to L may be weak, the top–
down input from higher levels H/G driven
by NSP may be strong enough to empha-
size the specificity of the visual experience
encoded in L. The pending task should
be to try disentangle these two expla-
nations experimentally. The experiments
should ascertain whether the two modes
of top–down modulation are incompat-
ible or mutually complementary. In the
latter case—how the two types of down-
propagation are specifically combined and
what relative roles each of them has? It
is also possible that the standard views
of reentrance (e.g., Di Lollo et al., 2000;
Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000) may be valid
in some empirical instances, difficult to
ascertain in some other cases, and incom-
patible with the neurophysiological reali-
ties of processing in different experiments.
Let me comment on some examples of
typical experiments aimed at supporting
the standard views of reentrance listed
below and see whether version (i) should
be exclusively preferred or whether ver-
sions (i) and (ii) both are compatible with
the experimental results.
1. In typical object substitution mask-
ing (OSM) a target stimulus (e.g., a
Landolt C) is presented together with
four dots that surround the target.
When after a very brief delay the tar-
get is switched off, the four dots either
are also switched off or remain dis-
played for varing duration acting as
a post-mask (the simultaneous onset,
asynchronous offset condition.) The
delayed-offset condition leads to strong
masking but in the simultaneous-offset
condition masking is weak. The classic
theory of OSM (Di Lollo et al., 2000,
but see Põder, 2013) explains this by
a reentrant model (a variety of model
i) according to which target-activated
units at level H activated by the target
send reentrant signals back to level L in
order to test whether levels H and L are
consistent in representing the target. If
mismatch is registered (e.g., when tar-
get signals do not arrive anymore and
mask signals arrive instead), the iter-
ative feedforward-reentrant cycles are
interrupted and new iterative “hypoth-
esis testing” begins for the new object—
the mask. Because cycles of reentrance
are necessary for registration of the
stimulus in awareness, the target is not
consciously perceived when reentrant
testing is prematurely interrupted by
the stronger top–down mask signal.
However, when mask’s offset is syn-
chronous with that of the target, the
target-plus-mask is a composite object
that provides both level L and H con-
tents; hence, the target can be extracted
from the composite representation that
is maintained through the feedword-
reentrant cycles. Let us see how the
model (ii) works for OSM. Presentation
of target evokes specific signaling along
L-H vertical axis and also a collater-
ally ignited boost of NSP modulation.
(NSP is necessary for awareness of the
specific contents represented by L and
H.) When asynchroneous-offset mask
remains in view and target signals do
not arrive anymore, the top–down acti-
vation G that was initiated fast at higher
levels, but takes time to become active
at lower levels “finds” mask related
activity in L, but the target related
activity has decayed already realtive to
the mask activity, because the target
was switched off earlier. Although the
level G activity is non-specific, when
its downpropagating generic influence
reaches L it helps emphasize mask
features because level L units them-
selves are specific. Themask-object rep-
resentation becomes consciously per-
ceived instead of target. Thus, mod-
els (i) and (ii) both are usable. At
this point one may ask why not fol-
low Ockham’s rule and take the sim-
pler one (i), i.e., the one with fewer
hypotheses? However, the G units are
important because neurobiological evi-
dence has overwhelmingly shown that
NSP is necessary for awareness of
the specific contents represented by
L and H.
2. In Lamme et al. (2000) monkeys were
trained to discriminate visual targets.
V1 responses began to differentiate the
“seen” from the “unseen” trials after
125ms. In subsequent studies occipital
ERPs in humans differentiated visibil-
ity of masked targets after 109–141ms
or peaked at about 160ms (Fahrenfort
et al., 2007, 2008). Again, a variety of
model (i) was used for explaining the
results because specifically the tempo-
rally late target related activity at level
L (which followed earlier time epochs
sufficient for level H to have become
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active in target processing) were asso-
ciated with correct discrimination. And
again, model (ii) can explain these
empirical results: the late part of neural
activity at L which is enhanced in trials
where target is successfully discrimi-
nated may be modulated by the top–
down process G passed down through
levels H (or even bypassing stimulus-
specific level H units either via direct
fibers or level H units different from the
stimulus-related ones).
3. Temporal precedence of high-level
MEG activity which discriminated cor-
rect and incorrect target processing
over low level activity in the study by
Bar et al. (2006) was also interpreted
as a variety of model (i). However,
if activity of G at frontal sites fluctu-
ates (fluctuation of the thalamocortical
NSP activity is a norm rather than
an exception) and dictates whether
the top–down modulation is stronger
or weaker, these experimental results
can be interpreted also according to
model (ii).
4. Ro et al. (2003) utilized transcra-
nial magnetic stimulation (TMS) in a
metacontrast masking paradigm and
showed that TMS of visual cortex, when
timed to produce visual suppression
of an annulus (a metacontrast mask),
induced recovery of a target disc which
was imperceptible when TMS was not
used. Moreover, TMS suppression of
an annulus was more pronounced
when a disk preceded it than when
an annulus was presented alone. The
authors assume that when the later
activity, supposedly reflecting the reen-
trant effects is suppressed then tar-
get perceptibility can be reinstated.
They argue that a prior visual stimu-
lus can influence subsequent percep-
tion at early stages of visual encod-
ing via feedback projections, support-
ing model (i). Alternatively, model (ii)
can also be applied. It is known that
a preceding brief stimulus (e.g., target)
speeds up perception of the follow-
ing stimulus (e.g., mask) (Bachmann,
1989; Scharlau, 2007). When target
disc was presented before mask it may
have speeded up masking annulus pro-
cessing by presetting NSP modulation
for its signals. This in turn may have
optimized the effective processing delay
so as to coincide with themaximal TMS
effect.
5. Up to now, both models appear to be
equally applicable, but model (ii) pro-
vides an explanation of the results of
an elegant experiment carried out by
Wu et al. (2009) that model (i) can-
not as readily provide. Capitalizing on
the motion-induced blindness (MIB)
phenomenon (Bonneh et al., 2001),
where a static visual target-object con-
tinuously presented on a rotating back-
ground periodically disappears from
awareness, they showed that a flashed
stimulus that caused reappearance in
awareness of the target was perceived
after the reappearance of the target in
consciousness. (The temporal value of
reversal was about 100ms, which is
the value assumed to characterize the
full cycle of reentrance based visual
processing for awareness.) The tem-
poral advantage of updating the con-
scious representation from the preex-
isting unconscious representation of
the invisible static target was explained
by a version of model (i), invok-
ing reentry of neural signals after the
first feed-forward sweep for a stimu-
lus to be consciously perceived. Thus,
MIB, by blocking reentry signals, pre-
vents awareness. In Bachmann and Aru
(2009) we pointed out some inconsis-
tencies of this explanation and offered
an explanation in terms of model (ii).
When an object fades from awareness
by MIB, its L and H level activity
will be sustained because cortical spe-
cific signals are constantly present, but
now it is dissociated from NSP-activity.
When the flashed object is presented,
the L/H process for representation of
the flash occurs in parallel with a boost
of the NSP-process igniting G. G leads
to binding of the already present pre-
conscious L/H-activity of the target
with global consciousness-level repre-
sentation. This process takes little time,
because there is no need for build-up of
the content-specific L/H representation
of the target; consequently, its rapid
reappearance in consciousness. The
flashed object appears in consciousness
not as fast, because its correspond-
ing coherent L/H-representation must
be built up, which takes time. The G
that services target awareness has L/H
content of the target ready on the “wait-
ing list” but the G process has to wait as
a “dummy process” until the L/H con-
tents of the flashed object are ready to be
modulated.
It appears that experiments have difficulty
in distinguishing between the two models.
This raises the question whether a compu-
tational/mathematical argument could be
developed that allows to test different pre-
dictions about experimental data on the
basis of the two models. Sadly, space does
not allow me to dwell into this important
perspective which must be dealt with in
future research.
CONCLUSION
In this opinion paper I argued for the view
that in the majority of the standard exper-
imental studies set to support the model
of top–down processing featuring exclu-
sively the specific system components also
the combined non-specific/specific model
seems equally valid.
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